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Abstract: Various conceptualizations of psychotic experience are evaluated on 
the basis of a year-long extra-therapeutic relationship between the author and 
a 15-year-old teen diagnosed with a psychotic disorder. Perspectives ranging 
from the clinician’s sign-based neo-Kraepelinian classification of ideational 
pathologies to the ethnographer’s hermeneutic interpretations of symptoms are 
considered, providing ethnographic and auto-ethnographic data to argue that 
crystallized explanatory systems fail to account for all instances of psychotic 
experience. Reductionist approaches thus perpetuate the mystification of socio-
economic and cultural aspects of madness and social control, further limiting 
the range of the sanctioned discourses on normalcy and sanity. Recovering 
the narrative voices of the afflicted is highlighted as a necessary step to help 
redefine concepts of madness beyond the dominant biologicist/psychologicist 
stigmatizing labels, emphasizing the need to construct and facilitate supportive 
environments rooted in reciprocity, horizontality and peer-to-peer guidance in 
which expert and popular knowledge can be better integrated and command 
equal weight. 
Key Words: schizophrenia; madness; extra-therapeutic; reciprocity; 
ethnography; peer-to peer.
Resumen: Diferentes conceptualizaciones de la psicosis son evaluadas a través 
de una relación extra terapéutica, a lo largo de un año, entre el autor y un adoles-
cente de 15 años diagnosticado con un trastorno psicótico. Perspectivas clínicas 
como la clasificación neo-Kraepeliniana de patologías ideacionales basadas en 
signos y perspectivas etnográficas basadas en la interpretación hermenéutica de 
síntomas son consideradas, ofreciendo datos etnográficos y auto-etnográficos 
para argumentar que sistemas explicativos cristalizados no logran encapsular la 
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totalidad de experiencias psicóticas. Aproximaciones reduccionistas perpetúan 
así la mistificación de los aspectos socioeconómicos y culturales de la locura y 
control social, limitando aún más el alcance de los discursos sancionados sobre 
la normalidad y cordura. Resaltamos la recuperación de las voces narrativas de 
los afectados como un paso necesario hacia la redefinición de la locura más allá 
de las etiquetas estigmatizadoras de los discursos biologicistas / psicologicistas 
dominantes, enfatizando la necesidad de construir y facilitar entornos de apo-
yo enraizados en reciprocidad, horizontalidad y ayuda peer-to-peer donde una 
mejor integración de saberes expertos y populares pueda ocurrir. 
Palabras clave: esquizofrenia; locura; extra-terapéutico; reciprocidad; etnogra-
fía; de igual a igual.
1. Introduction
Structured more or less like a case-study from the perspective of a young 
psychology student tutoring a teenager diagnosed and treated for childhood-
onset schizophrenia, this auto-ethnography should be read on two different 
levels. It is, of course, the story of a year-long interaction between its protagonists 
—Or and me—, but it is primarily the story of how my own understanding 
of Or’s experience (and, accordingly, my behavior) evolved during the time we 
spent together. The meta-narrative is thus a retrospective gaze that attempts 
to trace the development of my own understanding of what psychosis is, or 
—perhaps more accurately— what psychosis is not. 
The general outline is an examination of my relationship with Or from a 
variety of perspectives, building towards the conclusion that his experience 
ultimately escapes a fully satisfactory conceptualization under any one 
crystallized explanatory system. The examinations are, in chronological order, 
as follows: Or’s schizophrenia understood through the biologicist lens of neo-
Kraepelinian discourse, Or’s diagnosis understood as the result of complex 
mechanisms of social control, the influence of social, economic and cultural 
factors on his affliction and subsequent diagnosis and treatment and, lastly, 
Or’s narrative and symptoms examined retrospectively (remaining conscious of 
all the methodological faults implied by that asynchronicity). The interpretive 
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ethnographic approach borrowed from Martínez-Hernáez (2000). However 
partially valid for some cases, I conclude that all of these approaches and 
explanations are limited in their power to extrapolate from the particular to 
the general as far as they are all inextricably bound by an underlying ideology 
and a specific methodology, and they have different goals. 
On a more personal level —it is an auto-ethnography after all— this is also 
the story of how I began to become aware of my own arrogance and prejudices, 
and how I unmasked along the way the scientific hubris of institutions and 
professionals who claim to have authority over experience. My story reflects 
the stories of many honest and well-meaning professionals who, working under 
ideologically-loaded assumptions and assimilated dogmas are ultimately bound 
to reproduce hierarchical power relations and hence perpetuate the pervasive 
personal and social suffering they aim to ameliorate. Hence, I argue, for anybody 
earnestly and honestly interested in understanding consciousness in general 
and madness —psychosis, schizophrenia, mania, whatever it is called— in 
particular (and more importantly, in alleviating the inherent suffering attached 
to it), it is first imperative to climb down from the authoritative pedestal of 
knowing, opting instead for listening to the voices and stories of those who are 
experts of their own experience. 
2. “Here be Dragons”: social control and the neo-
Kraepelinian cartography of mind
I first met Or in his family’s house, a tiny two-bedroom apartment in the heart 
of Shkhunat Gimel (or simply, “Neighborhood Three” in Hebrew), one of the 
poorest and most neglected parts of Beer Sheva, a city with a population of 
some 200,000 inhabitants in southern Israel. For the last year of my bachelor’s 
degree in Psychology, I had been awarded a social scholarship on the condition 
that I committed to a tutoring project that paired children from underprivileged 
backgrounds with university students. The goal was to offer the child often-
needed personal attention, and help them to succeed at school despite their 
harsh life circumstances. When I arrived for the first interview, the coordinator 
of the program asked me to tutor a “special” kid. Intrigued, I enquired what 
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was so special about him. Or was an unusual candidate because he was well 
beyond the eligible age for tutorship in the program, and —she said— he 
was also a “schizophrenic”. His inclusion depended on finding a suitable tutor 
for him, preferably a physically strong, male, final-year psychology student, a 
description that I apparently met. 
Working with Or afforded me the opportunity to experience firsthand 
what it means to build a relationship with a young psychotic person, and 
get to know the “positive symptoms” that are often considered the mainstays 
of psychosis1 (the delusions, hallucinations, disorganized thought which 
I found fascinating). Although I had already been working with psychiatric 
patients for a couple of years, all of the people I had met up to that point were 
much older who had been in and out of psychiatric institutions, sometimes 
for decades, kept throughout on a steady diet of neuroleptics, sedatives and 
other psychopharmaceuticals. Most of them had been diagnosed with chronic 
schizophrenia, and almost exclusively exhibited what are known as “negative 
symptoms” (Andreasen & Olsen, 1982): flat expression and little emotion, 
poverty of speech and an overwhelming apathy and lack of will in which even 
the simplest of chores become an insurmountable burden. 
In the place where I worked, even the word “rehabilitation” had become a 
euphemism, and all of the personnel knew that even though our goals were to 
eventually help people move on to an independent, more fulfilling life, none of 
the 30 or so residents that lived there —a gated compound that encompassed 
three houses in the heart of Beer Sheva, a privatized “midway home”— was 
going anywhere except the occasional hospitalization for acute or subacute 
psychotic episodes. Or was my first glimpse into the inner-world and behavior 
of a young person going through the early stages of mental illness, a person 
who perceived reality and responded to it quite differently from how I did, and 
was still young enough and perhaps naive enough to trust me and share his 
stories with me. 
Sitting at a tiny table in the modest family home, Or smiled and introduced 
himself; he said he was pleased to meet me and that he hoped we would be 
friends and go for long walks in the city. Although it was obvious to me that the 
1 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric 
Association and now in its fifth edition, separates “positive” symptoms from “negative” symptoms, the former 
usually being associated with psychotic episodes and the latter being the emotional and cognitive deficits 
usually experienced over time (APA, 2013).
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introduction was well-rehearsed and he was following the script dictated by his 
well-meaning parents, it didn’t feel unauthentic or forced. He seemed genuinely 
excited and after a few minutes of conversation, he left the kitchen to go back to 
his usual activity, fumbling around the internet looking for information on his 
favorite pop-culture icons. He was obsessed, I would later discover, with reality 
shows and gossip programs, and often fantasized about being a participant in 
one. After he left for his room, his mother proceeded to tell me the story of 
Or and his illness, as perceived by the parents. They, too, were very happy and 
excited to meet me. Very soon I understood why they were so anxious and 
hopeful about our tutorship: they were terrified that Or would be taken away 
again by force.
“When Or was 12”, the mother said, “His school teacher called us, once 
again. She said that Or continued to be a disruptive influence on his classmates 
and, after a meeting with the school’s psychologist, they had decided that Or 
should go and see a child psychiatrist. We weren’t being consulted, we were 
being told. The psychiatrist saw him once, and on the basis of the information 
given by the school he diagnosed Or with a disease”. Naturally, I wanted to 
know what exactly Or “was”, but his parents were reluctant to share his exact 
diagnosis with me. Looking back, I now believe that they were afraid that if 
they labeled him, I would treat Or not as a child with a distinct biography with 
all of its idiosyncrasies, but rather as a clinical case. 
When I met him, Or was 14 and taking a steady diet of neuroleptics 
(quetiapine) and sedatives —mostly benzoadipines—, in addition to the 
methylphenidate he had been taking for years, presumably to treat another 
diagnosis of ADHD. His parents, very religious (although not orthodox) Jews 
from a very traditional background, initially refused to follow the psychiatrist’s 
indication as they didn’t consider Or to be sick; “He is a very good kid”, his 
mother would tell me, “he’s different than the other kids and has trouble 
adjusting to his school, but we have never considered him to be sick. He doesn’t 
really need to take those medicines.” 
At the time that Or was first diagnosed, a couple of years before we met, 
his parents decided not to comply with the psychiatric authorities and the 
psychopharmaceutic prescription they were handed. According to his mother, 
a few weeks after Or’s meeting with the psychiatrist, the school’s principal 
called Or’s parents to her office. It was an ultimatum: Or’s behavior at school 
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was unacceptable, and if they refused to listen to the psychiatric authorities, 
they would have no choice but to get the social services involved. Devastated 
and impotent, the parents returned home hoping for the best, unwilling 
to accept and internalize the experts’ unequivocal decision that Or was a 
mentally ill person who needed to be on drugs. A week later, a worker for the 
city’s childhood welfare services knocked on the door. With her, a couple of 
policemen entered the house, serving Or’s father with a warrant signed by the 
district’s chief psychiatrist. Their “lack of cooperation” was perceived by the 
school —and the state— as child neglect: Or was being denied the proper 
treatment that he needed and the pertinent authorities had come to take him 
away from his home by force. 
Or spent the next 18 months involuntarily committed to one of the 30 
beds of the inpatient adolescent’s ward of the Ness Ziona Psychiatric Hospital, 
a closed facility about an hour and a half ’s drive from his parents’ house. 
According to the current Israeli mental health legislation,2 the court can order 
involuntary hospitalization of a minor in one particular circumstance: the 
presence of a psychotic episode coupled with immediate and physical danger to 
self or others, as long as the perceived dangerousness of the patient is causally 
related to the presence of the mental illness ( Jaworowsky and Zabow, 1995). 
Israeli researchers Ajzenstadt et alii point out that “the definition of 
dangerousness is vague and its application to a particular situation remains 
totally within the province of an individual psychiatrist” (2001:649). The 
authors found that when asked to define which behaviors are considered 
dangerous and thus justify commitment, experts included “violence, clinical 
depression accompanied by a suicidal urge”, “neglecting oneself ” and “damaging 
property” alongside behaviors considered as ‘‘different’’ or ‘‘strange’’ such as 
“unlimited purchase of items and clothes, listening to music very loudly, and 
stockpiling garbage or ‘throwing eggs at the Prime Minister’”, while others 
mentioned “the ‘danger’ to the good reputation of a person” (Ajzenstadt et alii, 
2001:648).
One of the main problems with this model is that signs of mental illness can 
be inferred by professionals merely from “a person’s failure to behave according 
2 In 1991, this law replaced a heavily criticized previous provision, dating from 1955, and it has the explicit 
goal of improving Israel’s system of mental health care by avoiding unnecessary institutionalization and 
improve the patients human rights by treating them as outpatients in a community setting (Ajzenstad et 
alii, 2001).
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to specific expectations” (Ajzenstadt et alii, 2001:649). But it is not only the 
legal definitions and regulations that are ambiguous. Martínez-Hernáez points 
out that the problem of ambiguity is found in the DSM itself (2000). Despite 
the a-theoretical pretension of its taxonomies and its purported objectivity and 
scientific neutrality, mental health experts face significant difficulty to neutralize 
moral judgments and cultural values, making it hard “to distinguish between 
what is behaviorally pathological and socially normative… between clinical 
work and the bias introduced by the moral judgments of the professional; 
and between objective classification and a sort of corporate ‘common sense’” 
(2000:72).  
In more recent years authors such as Richard Gosden have addressed the 
controversial issue of preventive medicine programs, initiatives that seek to 
identify divergent behaviors in children and anticipate treatment before their 
supposed mental diseases develop (2001). Attempts to identify “pre-psychotic” 
adolescents, Godsen argues, are clear evidence of the use of psychiatry as a tool 
of social control, often failing to account for its policies with clinical evidence: 
not only is schizophrenia a very vague diagnosis with a very mysterious and 
contradictory etiology, but there are no clinical tests or biological markers 
that can confirm it (Godsen, 2001; Martínez-Hernáez, 2000). For Godsen, 
beyond the purported organic origin of the disease, these initiatives violate 
patient’s human rights as they pathologize people who do not conform to 
social norms and expectations (social control) or others whose psychosis could 
be interpreted as a meaningful crisis which, if successfully resolved, could play 
a significant and beneficial role in the life of that person3 (2001).
As well as the problematical ambiguity of legal and clinical terms that leave 
room for liberal interpretations based on individual and social prejudice in the 
prevention and diagnosis of psychosis, there are many other ideological and 
socio-economic forces and interests at play. In order to understand this better, 
it is important to understand the current ruling ideology in psychiatric practice: 
neo-Kraepelinism (Martínez-Hernáez, 2000). In his book What’s behind the 
symptom?, anthropologist Angel Martínez-Hernáez writes that there are two 
very different ways of understanding psychiatric symptomatology: the clinical 
approach, rooted in the neo-Kraepelinian project that reduces symptoms to 
3 This possibility has been defined by Godsen (2001) and others following Grof (1980) as a spiritual 
emergency.
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signs (understood as positive manifestations of organic abnormalities), and 
an anthropological approach rooted in dense descriptions that interprets 
symptoms as meaning (2000). In biomedical terminology, writes the author, 
“signs” are understood to be “objective evidence of disease which can be perceived 
by a professional” (2000:4), while symptoms are much more ambiguous 
and unreliable, emerging from the subjective perception, interpretation and 
expression of the patients themselves: “linguistic, cultural and semiotic realities 
which cannot be understood without considerable inference” Martínez-
Hernáez, 2000:82). Signs and symptoms thus refer to thoroughly different 
orders of reality: signs are part of an observable natural reality while symptoms 
emerge as “a human expression that embodies meaning” (Martínez-Hernáez, 
2000:4).
An elucidating example given by Martínez-Hernáez contrasts the self-
evident reality of a case of eczema, and the numerous possible interpretations 
of a statement such as “my heart is upset” (2000:4). While an eczema is most 
probably always an eczema, a distressed heart can mean very different things 
when expressed by different people: for an Iranian woman it may be related 
to the problems of feminine sexuality in an oppressive climate while for a 
Nahuatl native of Huayapan, the heart is indispensable for the good digestion 
of food. Furthermore, a patient from Barcelona may suffer from heart disease 
and others symbolically perceive the heart as the center of romantic life 
(Martínez-Hernáez, 2000:5). Unlike dermatologists, however, psychiatrists 
have to rely on symptoms: most psychiatric diagnoses lack the supporting 
evidence that is usually provided by clinical tests, and quests to find reliable 
biomarkers have proved mostly fruitless (Mills & Fernando, 2014; Whitaker, 
2004). The diagnosis is then given on the basis of symptoms, which are reified 
as signs. As pointed out by Martínez-Hernáez, biomedical discourse relies 
on a presupposed isomorphism between diagnostic categories (ideational) 
and pathological processes (real) (2000:80). From the perspective of the neo-
Kraepelinian clinician, there is no distance between the word and the thing 
(Martínez-Hernáez, 2000). The narrative of the person, as Foucault famously 
noted, is subordinated to a highly localized medical gaze, in which the emphasis 
is to look for medicable pathologies in the body instead of listening to the 
voices of the afflicted and the possible meaning they ascribe to their symptoms 
(2007). The individual manifestations of affliction are clumped into a universal 
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label that simplifies complex complaints to make them more manageable for 
professionals. This has been acknowledged by Dr. Allen Frances, lead editor 
of the fourth edition of the DSM, who unsurprisingly resorts to metaphor to 
explain the logic of descriptive psychiatry: “Diagnosis is part of the magic…
you know those medieval maps? In the places where they didn’t know what 
was going on, they wrote ‘Dragons live here’…we have a dragon’s world here. 
But you wouldn’t want to be without the map.” (Frances, quoted in Greenberg, 
2010). 
However, the efforts of neo-Kraepelinian psychiatry to chart the dragons 
of the mind come at a price: there is a deliberate confusion between the map 
and the territory, and the topographical accidents that are uncomfortable for 
efficient, highly individualistic clinical practice are mystified. “This naturalist 
approach”, writes Martínez-Hernáez, “denies us access to large or small worlds 
of meaning, to the cultural categories and political-economic relations that a 
complaint may contain” (2000:77). What we gain in clinical efficiency we lose 
in real understanding, as was stated decades ago by Judi Chamberlin, a political 
activist and leader in the “Psychiatric Survivors Movement”: 
In the medical model of mental illness, human emotions are transformed into 
symptoms. Behavior has meaning in the context of people’s lives; psychiatric 
labeling separates out certain behaviors and calls them part of a disease 
process. It is impossible to understand what is going on in the life of a person 
in crisis if his or her behavior is discredited in this way. (1978:109)
3. Continents of the mind: schizophrenia and its 
conceptualizations
I met Or twice a week for four hours over the course of the following year. 
When we first met, Or had been out of the psychiatric ward and back home for 
a few months and was attending a special school for teenagers with unspecified 
“special needs”. One of the first things that struck me after I got to know him 
was how sweet and intelligent he was. Not only did he not seem to be dangerous 
at all, but I could not detect a pinch of malice in his being. Or was very fond of 
human contact; he was very physical, and although a big, tall 14-year-old, he 
liked to clutch on to my hand as we walked through the city streets. He had 
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no social phobias or inhibitions; he was very extroverted and felt immediately 
comfortable and at ease with all the new people we met, readily hugging and 
shaking hands with strangers. Sometimes, it would be a little too much: he 
wouldn’t let go of my hand even if I asked him to or sometimes he would keep 
hugging someone until they pushed him, occasionally making them feel a bit 
uncomfortable.
Since our time together was flexible and we did not have to follow a pre-
determined script or program, Or and I would decide what to do and where 
to go. Besides his fascination with the virtual worlds of cathode rays and optic 
fibers, long walks in the city and frequent visits to the candy shop, he particularly 
liked spending time in my house. My friends and house-mates adored him, and 
kindly but quickly learnt to set boundaries for him, particularly the women: 
Or wasn’t always aware of other people’s “personal space”, or did not perceive 
it in the same way as most of us did. The perplexingly naive disregard that 
he seemed to have for social conventions was fascinating, and sometimes 
frustrating. Often, during our long walks in the city we would enter the local 
supermarket, and pretty soon I discovered that he was stealing chocolate and 
candy bars. Initially surprised and subsequently puzzled, I discovered that no 
amount of reasoning and no appeals to obedience would make him behave 
any differently. No matter what strategy I chose, I rarely managed to convince 
him to leave the supermarket empty-handed. Rather than becoming angry 
or frustrated, I tried to make the best of an opportunity to observe what I 
considered to be recurring and bizarre compulsive behavior. Going to the local 
supermarket became an exercise for the both of us, and it usually ended in the 
exact same way: with me checking Or’s pockets outside the store and him going 
back to return the unpaid-for items, looking more puzzled and disappointed 
than ashamed. 
As time passed, I began to understand that behaviors such as compulsive 
shoplifting or excessive affection and physicality could have provided the 
school staff and district psychiatrist with enough reasons to have Or forcefully 
committed. However, something in the quality of our interaction, coupled 
with my knowledge of his socioeconomic background, suggested to me that 
Or might have been acting as he did for reasons other than a pathological 
compulsion and error that endangered him or others. Although undeniably 
extravagant in his behavior, prone to elaborate fantasies of self-reference and 
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utterly unable to adapt to his assigned social role (a middle-school student in 
a compulsory formal education system), I never perceived Or to be violent, 
towards himself or others. In fact, besides instances of shoplifting4, no other 
expression or behavior suggested “dangerousness” to me. I knew, from his own 
stories and his parents’ reports, that Or had been in trouble at school a few 
times for fighting, but from their narratives I was left with the impression that 
Or was being bullied by other kids at school and he was merely trying to stand 
his ground. He did, however, fit perfectly into the Israeli prevailing cultural 
stereotype of “dangerous”: he was a teenage male from a notoriously poor 
and crime-ridden neighborhood in a peripheral city, he was from a mizrahi 
(oriental) ethnic background,5 and he was not particularly well suited to 
thriving in institutionalized school environments. 
From a personal level, it was very interesting to observe how my own 
behavior was being affected by Or’s. After shoplifting became a fixture of our 
long walks, I started noticing that I was acting as an agent of social control. 
Unconsciously, I had been micro-managing Or’s disruptive behavior, educating 
him in the proper ways to pursue consumer-commodity relationships, and I 
wasn’t even completely sure why. Was I worried that Or would grow up to be a 
criminal, did I want to save myself the trouble of having to constantly return the 
unpaid-for items, or was I just unconsciously defending the profit-margins of a 
corporation? In principle, my youthful rebellious and transgressive disposition 
saw no ethical problems or objections to the notion of an unprivileged kid from 
a marginalized neighborhood taking food from a chain supermarket; quite the 
contrary. Yet, as a tutor (being in a position of authority, however friendly), 
I could not possibly allow him to do so. By repeatedly taking him back to 
4 Shoplifting, although evidently illegal, seems to me to be a tricky situation, since the “danger” implicit in it 
is, of course, the personal legal repercussions, the “danger” of loss of profits for a chain-supermarket but also 
the danger of breaking with social norms that dictate that food is a commodity and in order to eat we must 
purchase it from specific for-profit outlets. The problem is evident in Israel, where 850,000 children (over 
one third of the children in the country) live below the poverty line, one of the highest rates in the developed 
world (Weiler-Polak, 2010). A child that shoplifts in order to eat could be conceptualized as “dangerous”, but 
we would be ignoring a lot of socioeconomic context: 75% of poor children in Israel forgo meals because of 
their economic status (Weiler-Polak, 2010).
5 Among the many polarizations inherent to modern Israeli society, one of the most prominent divides is 
found amongst descendants of Ashkenazi (Eastern and Central European) Jews and Mizrahi (Oriental) or 
Sepharadi (Spanish) Jews. In general, European Jews have dominated social, political and cultural circles 
since the creation of the state of Israel. It is curious —although not surprising— how the microcosmos 
of Israeli society reproduces the global power relations between the global “north” and “south”. For a classic 
review of this issue see Peres, 1971.
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the supermarket and in a theatrically shameful manner making him take the 
chocolate out of his pocket and put it in the counter, I was indoctrinating him 
into social conventions, despite my own discomfort with and suspicion of 
those same norms. The difference, I soon realized, was that Or was not acting 
out of any subversive ideology, there was no appeal to social justice behind his 
acts; he wasn’t making a point against neoliberal exploitation and consumerism 
by not paying for his candy. As far as I could see, he was ultimately acting 
from compulsion, a lack of understanding: an act of anarchy that was not 
based on a premeditated political philosophy but on a lack of capacity for self-
restraint.  
As a fascinating and intriguing fellow human being, I was obviously very 
much interested in Or. Until that point in our relationship, however, I had 
probably been much more interested in observing the symptoms of his disease 
to validate what I had learnt at school. As time passed, I became increasingly 
resistant to the idea that the enormous diversity, complexity and apparent 
idiosyncrasy of his behaviors and expressions were all reducible to the neo-
Kraepelinian category of “schizophrenia”. I also started noticing the unconscious 
damage that the scholarship program’s coordinator had unintentionally done 
by immediately presenting Or to me as “a schizophrenic child”: from the first 
moment, I had assumed that I was to interact primarily with a pathology that 
happened to be embodied within an actual person.
But besides becoming suspicious about a purely biologicist explanation 
for his symptoms, I couldn’t find enough reasons to categorically single-out 
the oppressive edifices of neoliberalism and classism that drove a hungry 
kid to petty theft either, and although tempting to ascribe Or’s behavior and 
delusions to an innate —if perhaps unconscious— romanticized rebellious 
and transgressive force within him, neither of these explanations was fully 
satisfactory, even when combined. I realized that if I wanted to understand 
his behavior, I might as well just ask him about it, instead of making my own 
inferences. Perhaps if I focused more on Or and less on his disease, we would 
be able to establish a more genuine, more reciprocal and less hierarchical 
relationship that would be more beneficial for the both of us.
“Why do you feel the need to steal candy from the shop?” I asked him one 
day. Or stared back at me with a puzzled smile: “Please promise that you won’t 
tell my mother”. “I can’t promise you that. Besides, you haven’t answered my 
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question”, I insisted. “Promise that you won’t tell her!” he said anxiously, his 
voice radically changing in pitch and tone. Although I tried to be as honest and 
transparent with him as I could, his parents were well aware of his shoplifting 
antics long before we even met, and sometimes we would talk about it after 
he had left the room. “Fine, I won’t tell”, I lied. “So why do you insist on 
taking things without paying for them?” Not once did Or give me an answer I 
considered useful, insightful or true. “Just let me take them. Can you pretend 
not to see this time?” he would ask. He was evasive, defensive and apparently 
uninterested in justifying his behavior to me. Perhaps there was nothing for 
him to justify. His only concerns in this regard were for his mother not to find 
out and for me to let him do as he wished. “Adam, today after we go to the 
supermarket, can you please promise me that you will not check my pockets?”, 
he asked once, with a hopeful and naive ingenuity that, more than anything, 
made me want to hug him.    
4. Ethnography as a vehicle of “near-experience”
Or had an obsession (if not clinical, at least in the colloquial use of the term) 
with pop culture and reality television personalities —particularly musical 
talent shows. He often talked about them as if he had met them and they 
were well acquainted with each other. He talked about their personal lives, 
intermingling his own narrative with the stories he heard on television or, I 
supposed, imagined in his mind. I had made a decision to always address Or 
as a mature, responsible adult and speak my own mind as if he was one of 
my friends, hoping that we could move beyond our pre-defined “tutorship” 
roles and eventually he would reciprocate in the same way. “Or”, —I would 
often say— “I’m really not interested in reality shows. I’m bored by cheap 
entertainment and I think there’s much better things to think about”. He would 
not get defensive, but he would smile as if he knew something that I did not, 
and make me promise that I would make an effort to watch if he ever made it 
to one of the myriad talent shows on TV. He was infatuated with appearing 
on live television. “Or, you cannot sing!”, I would tease him —he really could 
not, as I had already painfully confirmed many times— “How are you going to 
manage to get on that stage?”. Or would give me a look of complicity: “I have 
other talents, you know that already”.
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Other than reality shows, time travel was his favorite subject. It seemed 
that Or had no doubt that time-travel was not only possible, but that he was 
actively coming and going, jumping and cruising the time-space matrix as easily 
as he would walk to school every morning. He never had answers to practical 
matters. “Do you use a machine?” I would often ask him. He would laugh. “No 
machine”. “Well?” I would smile. “You just don’t need a machine. Why do you 
keep asking me silly questions?” The more I insisted the more disappointed he 
became with my lack of understanding or, perhaps, lack of imagination. Time 
travel became my favorite subject to discuss with Or for various reasons. It 
was far more interesting than mainstream television programming, for one, 
but it was also a subject that was unique in a very particular way: although 
a recurring theme in science-fiction, a common fantasy of children and a fun 
thought experiment, common sense dictates that time travel is impossible. 
His delusions to the contrary, however, still afforded me some anchoring to a 
paradigmatic symptom of a disease whose ontological validity was gradually 
being dissolved in my own mind. There was, however, one more thing: although 
still in the realm of speculation, the mathematical substrate for the theoretical 
possibility of time travel, when looked at from the perspective of relativistic 
physics (Hawkins, 2010) or quantum mechanics (Deutsch, 1991), is there. It 
is a fantasy that, although contrary to our common-sense and lived experience, 
is still theoretically possible. 
The mere possibility of it gave in an edge that set it apart —in my eyes— 
from the myriad other bizarre delusions I have heard in other interactions with 
psychiatric patients.6 Or himself, beyond constant talk about time travel, was 
also fond of asking me bizarre, repetitive questions about elementary physics. 
He was not interested in equations or theorems, and as far as I knew —from 
the few times he agreed to do his homework with me— he had neither the 
patience nor the inclination to do even very basic math. He was very interested 
in seemingly simplistic questions of cause and effect: “If we throw an egg from 
the roof of your house, do you think it will break?” he would ask, smiling. By 
this point I already knew that he was fiercely intelligent, and I suspected that 
6 In the outpatient midway home where I worked, telepathic communications with Vladimir Putin, 
Benyamin Netanyahu and even Bob Dylan were normal occurrences for one resident while another was 
tormented by the voice of a childhood acquaintance who repeatedly made obscene comments regarding his 
genitals.
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his questions were much more complex and loaded with hidden symbolical 
content and intention than I originally thought. I would think carefully about 
seemingly simple questions like this, trying to outsmart him. Most times, I 
wouldn’t answer myself but reflect the question back to him: “What do you 
think? If you throw an egg from the roof, will it break?”. “I think so, but can 
we check?” he asked grabbing into my arm. I laid a layer of old newspapers 
in the patio floor of my old house, and helped him up the ladder to the roof. 
“Go ahead”. Contemplating the egg smash and splatter against the floor, I was 
mystified by his continuous need of reassurance that the laws of physics were 
stable and constant and I was sure that it was somehow inextricably connected 
with his time-travel fantasies.
I have no way of knowing what went on in Or’s meetings with the 
psychiatrists of Beer Sheva or the Ness Ziona hospital, but it is quite certain 
that beyond his perceived “dangerous” behavior, improbable conversations with 
pop culture icons or talk about time travel were ticked off as hallucinations 
and delusions: positive symptoms reified as signs. Yet beyond the pathology-
centered clinical approach, argues Martínez-Hernáez, there are three ways in 
which a symptom can be read if we look through an ethnographic lens: it can 
be interpreted as figurative language, in which apparently nonsensical idioms 
are used as symbols or metaphors; it can be interpreted as deceit, in which 
the bizarre speech is deliberately used to lie and confuse the other; and it can 
be interpreted as telling the truth, however unlikely or bizarre it may appear 
based on the experience of the listener (2000). Since I never perceived or even 
suspected that Or was playing a role or that he was acting out an elaborate 
plan to deceive me, his family, his teachers and the mental health professionals, 
I will proceed now to analyze some of Or’s narratives and behaviors according 
to the other two possible interpretations, starting from the literal one: Or’s 
experience as true.
To pretend that Or was a time-traveler seeking fame and recognition in 
reality shows was fairly easy to dismiss. However, both for the sake of the 
argument, and the benefit of the doubt, I will attempt to take this possibility 
to its logical conclusion. Besides, I had already promised myself not to dismiss 
Or’s narrative as mere delusions or hallucinations rooted in error, however 
farfetched his stories seemed. In order to make a true attempt to bridge the 
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apparent gap between our inner worlds, I needed to acknowledge that neither 
Or nor myself had authority over the experience of the other or ultimate 
knowledge concerning the ontology of reality. 
The ethnographer does not focus on the pathology but on the 
phenomenological, narrative and psychosocial expressions of affliction, and 
aims to help people unearth their own resources to find the optimal way to 
address the experience according to their world of meanings. This does not 
necessarily mean that a possible pathological process is rejected. The social 
construction of “schizophrenia” does not negate an objective, underlying 
biological reality. Care must be taken not to reify and naturalize narratives and 
symptoms in much the same way that the natural must not be culturalized 
(Martinez-Hernaez, 2000:244). Here, the author points out, we also encounter 
the opposite paradox that arises from neo-Kraepelinian interpretations of 
winks as twitches: how far should we go in our efforts to interpret twitches as 
winks (2000)?
I do not think —and I never did— that Or was in fact a misunderstood 
stranded time-traveler or an inter-dimensional entity who happened to be 
stationed in the rough, crime-ridden neighborhoods of the Negev desert’s 
biggest urban center. The possible literal interpretation of Or’s symptom 
was easily discounted, even if perhaps for a short period of time I did try to 
romanticize him for embodying the archetype of the mad genius, the visionary 
who is so far ahead of his time that he is deemed a madman.7 Perhaps —
however unlikely it may seem— I hoped to gain, through a closer understanding 
of his experience, perspectives and information unavailable to me through 
the standard perceptual and cognitive channels of my own experience. Pretty 
soon, however, it became clear that the only constancy found in this particular 
narrative was incoherence. I resigned myself to the certainty that Or’s delusions 
of time travel were in fact delusions, yet it did not necessarily mean that his 
delusions were reducible to “signs” of his pathology. The next, obvious question 
was: is there any meaning hidden behind his delusions of time travel? A third 
reading of time travel as metaphor would probably be more pertinent.
7 One of the historical figures that caught my imagination at this time was Nikola Tesla (1856-1943), the 
Serbian American inventor of the modern alternating current (AC) electricity supply system, yet also well-
known in popular alternative culture for his purported advances in the mythical field of free-energy (Tesla, 
1900). Several authors have pointed out that Tesla’s extravagant (if revolutionary) ideas and behaviors could 
probably “earn” him a retrospective diagnosis of Schizophrenia (Cheney, 1989).
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Perhaps the only part of Or’s experience that was self-evident was that it 
had been greatly marked by suffering. Although generally happy and cheerful, 
the traumatic impact of coercive hospitalizations and being forcefully removed 
from his family and environment could easily explain his basic suspicion of 
a world that violently invalidated his experience. His imagined time-travel, I 
suppose, was a way for him to cope with the systematic oppression and lack 
of understanding he had to endure everywhere he went, much as kids invent 
elaborate imaginary friends to help them cope with social stress. A sort of 
escape valve into a different time and space where he would be able to fit in. 
The strength and clinginess in the manner in which he held my hand wherever 
we went also suggested immaturity or insecurity, but later I came to suspect 
that he was not so much clinging to me in particular but he was much more 
generally clinging to the material world based on a fundamental distrust of its 
permanence and solidity, as if at any moment gravity would be reversed and 
he would find himself flying upwards into the sky. He seemed to be lacking a 
grounding not only in the realm of social conventions but also in the physical 
world of causality and constancy, living in a much more fluid and oneiric world, 
lucid-dreaming his way through life and feeling persecuted for it. 
Over the course of the next few months, I did everything in my power 
to extract meaning from Or’s seemingly idiosyncratic, even if somewhat 
predictable, responses and behaviors. As time passed, however, and our 
relationship developed, I started to become increasingly worried that there 
was no way for me to penetrate what seemed to be a chaotic and disorganized 
local world of meanings (Martínez-Hernáez, 2000). I got frustrated with 
myself for failing to make sense of it, and doubted whether my precarious 
hermeneutic abilities were good enough to communicate with Or. Even 
worse, I started to doubt that there was any meaning at all hidden beneath 
the layers of bizarre, disorganized thought. Time-travel intermingled with 
pop-culture, conversations about meaningful events in his life were tainted by 
unlikely interactions with Israeli reality television personas. Or he seemed to 
be inhabiting a hyperreal space, in which he unconsciously mistook someone 
else’s version of reality (television writers and performers) as his own, fiction 
and fact indistinguishable from each other. Whenever I thought I held the end 
of a string, it unraveled into more and more incoherence. Trying to keep things 
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friendly, horizontal and reciprocal was always a big challenge, as I felt that I 
was not getting what I wanted from him: clear and definitive answers that 
would allow me to unequivocally understand his behavior. I felt like a stranded 
traveler, whose path has been blocked by a tricky and pseudo-omniscient 
sphinx, and the only way to make headway is to solve its riddle, with the added 
difficulty of harboring a strong suspicion that there may be no answer at all 
for that riddle, and instead of a sphinx I was facing a Zen Master handing 
me kōans8 to show me the limits of rationality and systematically destroy my 
own internal logic. I understood that I was unable to make order from the 
disorder in a discourse that was making me feel uncomfortable. “No wonder”, I 
now realized, “that clinicians prefer to medicate and confine”. It is much easier 
and effective to suppress positive symptoms than to face the perplexing task of 
finding common ground between such seemingly different experiences. 
The complexities and intricacies of the social control of the “mad” became 
self-evident as I experienced how risky that perceived lack of common ground 
can be to our carefully curated consensus-reality. In the words of Martínez-
Hernáez (the translation is mine), “The current social strategy is to negate the 
word of the mad, to invisibilize and hide abnormality by locating them outside 
the social scene. Its purpose is to protect society from madness, from its 
inherent capacity to ‘implode the logic of common sense’” (Martínez-Hernáez, 
2013:202). Furthermore, narratives of “mad” experience cause social refraction 
that places the individuals in the realm of the ob-scene, in the etymological 
sense of the word: offstage (Martínez-Hernáez, 2013).
In retrospective, I realize that my own fixations with “understanding” Or or 
“making sense of his experience” prevented me from really approaching him as 
an equal; despite my best intentions, I never dislodged him from his role as a 
fascinating object of study for a young and inexperienced psychology student. 
I was always looking at Or through an inexpert and inexperienced clinical 
lens, merely attempting to highlight our humanity throughout the interaction. 
Although I recognize that I did try to engage in a rudimentary hermeneutical 
approach to try and find meaning behind Or’s symptoms, I never truly went 
beyond my initial tendency to distinguish true from false or what is “real” from 
8 In Zen practice, a kōan is a short story or statement that seems nonsensical or irrational and is traditionally 
used to demonstrate the limits of rationality and logic: “A monk asked Jôshû, ‘What is the meaning of the 
patriarch’s coming from the West?’ Jôshû said, ‘The oak tree there in the garden’” (Wick, 2005).
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what is not. “This presence or absence of distinguishing the normal from the 
pathological”, argues Martínez-Hernáez following Weber (1968), is precisely 
what separates these two different forms of understanding phenomena 
(2000:16). 
Besides the fact that the primary goal of our relationship was tutorship 
and ethnographic approaches were foreign to me, to say that after 12 months 
of meeting Or twice a week I understood his internal experience a little better 
is saying too much. However, to say that after 12 months of meeting him 
twice a week, I understood myself a little better is much more accurate: our 
interaction managed to dissolve many of the projections I was forcing into him, 
trying desperately to make him fit into the categories I had conceptualized for 
him, whether that of the psychotic, the mad genius, the oppressed and hungry 
shoplifter or the logic-shattering koan. It allowed me to consider the fact that 
everything I had learnt so far about psychosis was useful up to a certain point, 
and that beyond that point, the truth is that we know very little about how 
our own mind works, let alone the mind of others. The inherent subjectivity 
of experience, argues R.D. Laing, makes it impossible to make any definitive 
assertions about somebody else’s (1967). 
How close do we need to get to each other in order to understand our 
experiences well enough to make useful inferences? While it may be true that 
“one need not have been a Caesar in order to understand Caesar” (Weber, in 
Martínez-Hernáez, 2000:15), we can still argue that it would be much easier 
to understand Caesar if one had been born and raised in a patrician family 
in Rome around the year 100 BC, participated in the Siege of Mytilene as 
a Roman soldier, kidnapped by pirates while crossing the Aegean sea or at 
some point of life appointed chief priest of the Roman state religion. Thus, 
one of the main insights of my early therapeutic interactions is the need for 
reciprocal peer-to-peer environments in which experts of their own experience 
can provide guidance, support and navigational maps to people going through 
similar episodes; spaces that are perhaps facilitated by the ethnographer (or 
other mental health experts or non-experts), who has the proper perspective 
needed to differentiate between the winks and the twitches, yet primarily 
run by the natives for the natives. There is a lot of value in being supported 
by people who have previous personal experience with non-ordinary states of 
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consciousness in order to build solid bridges built on shared-experience that 
potentiate empathy and the ability to relate on a deeper personal level with the 
experience of the other.9 
Furthermore, although ethnography is evidently a vehicle for “experience-
near” observation in comparison to the “experience-distant” gaze of clinicians 
(Martínez-Hernáez, 2000), even the most diligent and professional 
ethnographic interpretation has obvious limitations: occasional failures to 
reveal autochthonous meanings, a lack of interest in the pathological meaning 
and a certain unwillingness to attempt an explanation that goes beyond the 
hermeneutic circle (Martínez-Hernáez, 2000:243). However, as the author 
points out, while perfect interpretation of the other’s experience may in fact be 
unattainable this does not mean that a partial one cannot be of help. If on the 
one hand we refuse to reduce the stories of the afflicted to “an inventory of facts 
reshaped in terms of diagnostic criteria” (Martínez-Hernáez, 2000), and on 
the other we understand the limits of ethnographic interpretation, we still have 
our best resources at hand: the experience and narrative voices of the afflicted 
themselves and the basic human qualities of empathy, compassion, reciprocity 
and mutual care. Yet, despite our best intentions, the ingrained ethics, ideology 
and economic policies by which our assistential systems are often driven to 
provide a disservice to the afflicted and their communities, because both users 
and professionals —speaking from my own experience— both users and 
professionals often feel dissatisfied with the level of care and attention that the 
current systems are able to provide.
Furthermore, ethnographic approaches allow us to disassociate between 
non-ordinary experience and pathology, at least momentarily. By doing so, 
we make it possible to merely accept the differences. The focus then is shifted 
to a radically inclusive approach that respects and acknowledges “the infinite 
diversity of human experience” (Icarus Project Mission Statement, n.d.), even in 
9 Verstehen, in Weber’s model, refers to the act of sociological understanding that is derived from the 
separation between the researcher’s position and the native’s perspective (Martínez-Hernáez, 2000). In 
our example, a Roman soldier who participated with Caesar in the Siege of Mytilene would naturally have 
a very different perspective of Caesar than that of modern historians. The ethnographer who engages in 
participant-observation in an interaction with a “mad” person thus plays a double role: that of the observer, 
in a familiar world, and that of the native, in an unknown one; he oscillates between the two in order to make 
sense of the unknown through his rooting in the familiar, being able to ascribe meaning to the “twitches”. And 
yet, I argue, since he lacks the first-hand direct experience of “madness” and has not experienced the social 
repercussions it entails, he is still lacking in perspective and drive to really engage in a reciprocal relationship 
with the “mad”. Hence, the emphasis on peer-to-peer environments, in which articipation equals facilitation. 
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situations in which the hermeneutic circle fails. We are left with the possibility 
of allowing a social and cultural context unfold in which symptoms do not need 
to be misrepresented as signs of pathologies, nor only partially understood as 
local worlds of meaning but rather integrated into the fabric of reality, either as 
legitimate ways of experiencing the world or as expressions of deep affliction 
that may also hold within themselves the seeds for deep transformational 
change. Without ignoring the possibility of organic pathology in some cases, 
psychosis could regain its depoliticized dimensions as a manifestation of 
systemic oppression, of social imbalance, of repressed dissent; we could recover 
its transgressive potential as an agent of deep individual and social change. This 
does not mean that we are arguing for the total dismantling of psychiatry or for 
a categorical rejection of diagnostic constructs. In my experience, these claims 
are somewhat naive and limited, and are lacking a wider perspective of the 
pervasiveness and depth of human suffering. If we aim for radical inclusion, it 
may be wiser to strive towards better integrating all the tools, technologies and 
methodologies available so that individuals can be treated according to their 
own ordering cosmology and universe of meanings. 
Despite strong proponents from different perspectives, it seems inadequate 
to reduce all instances of psychosis to one single explanatory system. It now 
seems that psychosis is not rooted only in abnormal neurobiology; it is not only 
a psychiatric fiction invented by pharmaceutical executives to sell more drugs, 
or by authoritarian politicians to pathologize dissent; it is not only a social 
or cultural construction, contingent to a certain social order; it is not only, as 
transpersonal psychologists argue, the natural wisdom of being manifesting 
as a spiritual emergency indispensable for personal growth; psychosis is not 
only a normal reaction to a an extremely alienating and exploitative capitalist 
system. It is not only, as R.D. Laing argued, a normal reaction to the deep 
alienation inherent in our pathological societies (1967). It may sometimes be 
some of these, sometimes many of them together and sometimes just a natural 
expression of divergent yet equally valid experience. 
In this regard, we should be careful not to impose new layers of ideology 
upon people who may not be interested in the social and cultural validation 
of their divergent experience but simply in better and more effective ways 
to treat symptoms, alleviate suffering and thus be able to lead “normal” lives 
to the best of their abilities. As an example, this is one of the main points of 
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conflict and controversy within the Autistic Neurodiversity movement, divided 
between those who see autism as the natural expression of a non-pathological 
and equally valid neural configuration and those who argue for more research 
and better psychopharmaceutical and therapeutic options for treatment 
(Ortega, 2009). The first and most important issue is and should always be to 
address the intense mental suffering and anxiety that are ubiquitous to mental 
affliction, not by superimposing ideology but by creating meaningful dialogues 
between expert knowledge and professionals and the afflicted individuals and 
collectives.
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